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Decryption failures as side channel attacks

conference contribution
posted on 2024-11-03, 12:22 authored by Joanne Hall, Margreta Kuijper
Securing information involves multiple layers: mathematical encryption, protocol design, software implementation and hardware implementation. Multiple disciplines are involved, mathematicians, software developers, telecommunication technicians and cybersecurity engineers. Mathematical cryptanalysis analyses encrypted information, whereas side channel cryptanalysis analyses information leaked via software/hardware implementation. In this presentation we give an overview of reaction attacks due to protocol-based leaked information. We particularly look at McEliece Cryptosystems, also called Code Based Cryptography, using LDPC codes. The LDPC McEliece crypto system is vulnerable to reaction attacks. We discuss reaction attacks that use decryption failure events to gather information about the decryption key. We propose to consider such decryption failures as a side channel from which information can be gathered. We conclude that any code-based cryptographic protocol requires careful cybersecurity engineering management of decryption failure events.

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Related Materials

Start page

315

End page

318

Total pages

4

Outlet

Proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems

Name of conference

MTNS 2018

Publisher

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Place published

Hong Kong

Start date

2018-07-16

End date

2018-07-20

Language

English

Former Identifier

2006086504

Esploro creation date

2022-07-07

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