Simultaneous effects of clustering and endogeneity on the underpricing difference of IPO firms: A global evidence

This paper provides the first empirical examination of the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses (EWL) theory in explaining the global underpricing difference while simultaneously accounting for various clustering effects on the endogenous underwriter-underpricing relationship. We carefully evaluate the effect of clustering in standard errors within years, industries, countries, and developed versus developing countries. Employed here is a large global dataset comprising 10,212 IPO-issuing firms from 22 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2016. Our 2SLS results provide strong evidence relating the existence of dispersion in underpricing in the global IPO market to the three dimensions of the EWL theory. When the degree of ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the time of offering is high, results show that in countries with a high level of IPO underpricing, issuers sell less secondary shares, create less primary shares, and employ less reputable underwriters. After adjusting for the clustering effect, the EWL model fails in cross-country settings and in developing stock markets while it succeeds in developed ones. This is due to the failure to capture the endogenous underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship. We show how ignoring one- and two-way clustering effects in the IPO data influences results. The validity of the EWL model particularly the statistical significance of the endogenous underwriter reputation-underpricing relationship vanishes based on the way we cluster our standard errors. Instead, we uncover conclusive evidence supporting the spinning behavior rationale where prestigious underwriters in developing equity markets burden IPO firms with a hefty underwriting fee. Sequentially, they leave big amounts of money on the table for investors to cash it out at the expense of issuers. Entrepreneurs in developing nations appear not to be concerned by this spinning practice, because they care little about their wealth losses in exchange for securing successful offering. Policy-wise, the paper provides several practical contributions.