RMIT University
Browse

The mandatory bid rule in China

journal contribution
posted on 2024-11-01, 22:01 authored by Wei Cai
Takeover has been widely accepted as a necessary method to improve the performance of certain inefficient firms. However, strict enforcement of the Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR) would make takeovers impossible in China. As a result, its operative effect has been diluted through a series of measures. First, the China Securities Regulatory Commission has always granted exemptions from mandatory bid obligations to avoid the detrimental effects of strict enforcement. Second, in practice, certain firms that do not apply for exemptions or fail in their applications are able to circumvent their mandatory bid obligations by launching takeovers within an appropriate time period when the market is booming. Third, this circumvention is facilitated by rules allowing for the adjustment of the bid consideration. Fourth, the proportional partial takeover bid rule was introduced in 2006, further weakening the regime. These realities make the MBR exist in name only in China, yet it can still create obstacles to takeovers. Therefore, it should be abolished.

History

Journal

European Business Organization Law Review

Volume

12

Issue

4

Start page

653

End page

680

Total pages

28

Publisher

Springer

Place published

Germany

Language

English

Copyright

© 2011 T.M.C.ASSER PRESS

Former Identifier

2006055376

Esploro creation date

2020-06-22

Fedora creation date

2015-10-07

Usage metrics

    Scholarly Works

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC