RMIT University
Browse

The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement

journal contribution
posted on 2024-11-01, 13:45 authored by Benjamin Hermalin, Qiang LiQiang Li, Anthony Naughton
We consider how parties' formal contracts are underpinned by their ongoing relationship and how welfare changes as the legal system improves. Regardless of impatience, the parties write formal contracts that they would not honor-despite stipulated penalties-if they interacted only once. The change in welfare with an improvement in the legal system can be ambiguous and even non-monotonic.

History

Journal

Economics Letters

Volume

119

Start page

72

End page

76

Total pages

5

Publisher

Elsevier

Place published

United Kingdom

Language

English

Copyright

© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Former Identifier

2006040609

Esploro creation date

2020-06-22

Fedora creation date

2013-04-23

Usage metrics

    Scholarly Works

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC