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Which matters: "Paying to play" or stable business relationship? Evidence on analyst recommendation and mutual fund commission fee payment

journal contribution
posted on 2024-11-01, 23:25 authored by Haozhi Huang, Mingsheng Li, Jing Shi
This paper investigates the factors that affect the likelihood of maintaining a stable relationship between a brokerage firm and its client funds and the effect of such a stable business relationship on analyst recommendations. We find that young funds, particularly those in small fund families, have more incentives to maintain business ties with their current brokerage firms. A common ownership affiliation between a fund and a brokerage firm or with a third institution further enhances the probability that the brokerage firm and the funds will maintain a stable relationship. More importantly, analysts issue more optimistic recommendations on stocks that are held by their brokerage firms' stably related funds (SRFs) than on stocks that are held by other funds. The effect is more pronounced after excluding large firms. The results are robust after controlling for underwriting relation, commission fees, funds' shareholding and other factors.

History

Related Materials

  1. 1.
    DOI - Is published in 10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.02.010
  2. 2.
    ISSN - Is published in 0927538X

Journal

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal

Volume

40

Issue

Part B

Start page

403

End page

423

Total pages

21

Publisher

Elsevier

Place published

Netherlands

Language

English

Copyright

© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Former Identifier

2006060047

Esploro creation date

2020-06-22

Fedora creation date

2016-03-23

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