The transition of US foreign policy and Pakistan after 9/11

This thesis seeks to examine the foreign policy and security approach of the United States in the context of its operations with Pakistan after 9/11 across the Bush (2001-2009) and the Obama (2009'2017) administrations. Every state articulates its policies in such a way as to optimise the existing challenges within the orbit of its choices. The 9/11 attacks altered US foreign policy strategies and the War on Terror (WOT) and overall affected the global security paradigm. Jihadist hijackers attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US with three planes. Almost 3000 people were killed in the attacks, including citizens of eighty nations. Al-Qaeda was held responsible for the attacks and Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda, was evidently harboured in Afghanistan. As this thesis will illustrate, Pakistan would come to assume a prime position in the WOT because of its adjoining border with Afghanistan. The US required Pakistani support to initiate and sustain the requirements of the WOT. The US asked Pakistan to break ties with the Taliban and join the US in the WOT. President Musharraf in Pakistan acceded to all the US's demands and Pakistan became a front-line ally in the WOT. The US along with the coalition forces invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 to eradicate terrorists and their supporters. US President George Walker Bush declared that the WOT was his administration's paramount policy and he altered his foreign policy goals accordingly. Bush was determined to act unilaterally against terrorism. The shift in Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban served US interests but deeply impacted the social, economic and security environment on the domestic front. Pakistan had to face the challenge of terrorism and militancy as a result of joining the WOT. The research conducted will reveal that across both the Bush and Obama administrations, while Pakistan conducted military operations in the tribal areas and sacrificed thousands of civilians and military personnel, the US never trusted Pakistan's efforts to eliminate the menace of terrorism in the region during the WOT. The porous borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan provided assistance in cross-border infiltrations. Conversely, Pakistan was also suspicious of the US because the US never proved to be a trustworthy friend of Pakistan, as evident in the preceding history. After Bush, the Obama administration attempted to change the tactics of the WOT by placing more emphasis on drone strikes and strengthening the civilian institutions in Pakistan. The amplification in drone usage killed a large number of the civilian population in Pakistan. This only worked to spur hatred among the population against the US as well as against the armed forces in Pakistan who were involved in military operations in tribal areas. Pakistan's traditional enmity with India resulted in insecurity on the eastern border and, after joining the WOT, the fear of insecurity from the western border also haunted the policy makers of Pakistan. While there is a comprehensive literature dealing with the US policy in WOT in Afghanistan and South Asia, a considerable gap exists concerning the US's engagement with Pakistan during WOT and the impact on Pakistan after joining the WOT. Drawing mainly on qualitative document analysis, the investigation finds that states have to articulate their policies according to regional and global dynamics. The regional security dilemma of Pakistan and global security imperatives compelled it to avert the pro-Taliban policy. The convergence and divergence of interests between Pakistan and the US in the WOT coerced Pakistan to comply with some of the US demands while declining or reneging the others. This study investigates and analyses the policy options that would ensure both Pakistan and the US to work earnestly by securing the interests of all the regional stakeholders to eradicate terrorism and to achieve regional stability. The blame for terrorists' activities in the region has often rested on Pakistan's shoulders by the US policy makers due to its interactions with Taliban and Jihadi groups. In examining the transition of US foreign policy across the Bush and Obama administrations in the context of Pakistan, this study, however, seeks to analyse the realities on the ground in Pakistan; often neglected by Western scholars, and thereby, filling a gap in the scholarship by providing a Pakistani perspective. In this way this research helps to analyse the reasons behind the divergence of US policies and Pakistan's interests.